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ABSTRACT
This article looksat twoperiods in thehistoryofwhite supremacy inNew
Zealand: the short-lived explosion of skinhead groups in the 1990s, and
the contemporary rise of the internet-driven alt-right. It looks at the
similarities and differences between the two groups, looking at style,
symbols, ideology, and behaviour. It looks at the history of these two
movements in New Zealand and compares the economic and social
factors that contributed to their rise, in particular how the different
social class of members produced groups with near-identical ideology
but radically different presentation and modes of action.
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On 12March 2019, New Zealand experienced its worst act of terrorist violence when aman
murdered 51 people in two mosques in Christchurch. While unprecedented in scale, it
joined a history of racially motivated murders and attacks. To that point, New Zealand’s
most obvious and publicly visible white supremacist element had been skinhead gangs.Mir-
roring trends in the UK, skinheads have had an often-significant presence, an amplification
of the undertones of casual racism that permeate most countries. The terrorist attack,
however, was linked to the online white supremacist community known as the alt-right.
Both the skinheads and the alt-right aremotivated by the same forms of issues and concerns,
but present in considerably different ways. This paper will look at the recent history of two
white supremacist movements in New Zealand, beginning with the rise of skinheads in the
1980s and the factors that created and influenced them. It will then look at the alt-right and
argue that this new development is not an extension of the skinhead phenomena, but a new
movement with only limited connections to past groups. It will also look at the factors that
motivated the rise of each group, and discuss the parallels between them.
The scene is set
Following overseas trends that stemmed initially from England in the late 1960s (Pollard
2016), the skinhead subculture emerged in various locations around New Zealand during
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the late 1970s (Jefferson 1976; Hamm 1993; Addison 1996) perhaps most prominently in
Christchurch. Three skinhead gangs formed there in the 1980s: the Christchurch Skins,
the United Skinheads (known as the ‘Uniteds’), and the Firm. These were not the only
skinhead groups in the city. Other less formal collectives were simply known by the
suburb from which they came – for instance, Papanui skins or Linwood skins – many
of whom were not overtly racist (Addison 1996, p. 101). Driven by local and international
music, for many youths, the skinhead look – tight jeans tucked into Dr Martin boots and
braces – was simply a fashion and a sense of identity, with no extreme ideology involved.
But as the economy began to shift, the harder, racist edge of the movement soon came to
the fore.
Radical economic reforms that were enacted by the Fourth Labour government (1984–
1990) and continued in the first term of the following National government (1990–1993)
led to significant social upheaval.
Despite promises that the post-1984 reforms would make it stronger, things got worse
before they got better and the economy went into recession during 1991 and 1992. Total
unemployment, already high post 1984, soared and eventually peaked at between 10% and
11%, and one in four Māori were unemployed. New Zealand was experiencing the most
significant rise in unemployment since the Great Depression (Massey 1995, p. 161).
A consequence of this economic malaise was the creation of social conditions identified
by international researchers as critical to gang formation and maturation – such as
poverty, strain, and multiple marginality (See for example, Hagedorn 1988; Taylor
1989; Jankowski 1991; Short 1996; Vigil 2002).
One consequence of this that was particularly obvious in the 1990s was the rise of
Pākehā street gangs, often with neo-fascist and white power tendencies, the most easily
identifiable of which were skinheads, who had largely turned from a fashion to fascism.
Focal concerns and ideological outlook
While exceptions were made for some Māori, perhaps driven by cohabitation in prisons,
the skinheads and white supremacists of this time railed against all of the usual suspects,
but their primary focus was Asian immigrants.
Contributing to, and a consequence of, New Zealand’s economic woes was a net loss
of migration. During the 1980s, New Zealand – a migrant nation – suffered a net
outflow of 30,000 people (Kasper 1990), which impacted on economic growth. Conse-
quently, a drive for suitable immigrants was proposed. And for this, New Zealand
turned to Asia. By 1990, 10,000 middle-class Asian migrants had settled in New
Zealand (Belich 2001, p. 537). The policy was keenly supported by the Business Round-
table which saw the benefit of attracting wealthy migrants in stimulating economic
growth (see Kasper 1990).
This influx of migration created tension among those who saw migrants as unwelcome
outsiders, in particular the skinheads, for whom anti-immigrant sentiment became a ral-
lying cry.
Although the different skinhead groups across the country were generally motivated by
many of the same focal concerns, they tended to be disparate and fights between the
groups were common. But while the internal politics of the white supremacy scene
tended to be riven with conflict, to outsiders the groups had obvious similarities.
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The skinhead style was the most evident, but the symbols used in the scene also tended
to be somewhat universal between skinhead and white power groups; primarily the swas-
tika, the numbers 88 and in the latter end of the 1990s 14, and runic symbols used by Nazi
organisations such as the SS. The swastika needs no definition here, except to say that it
has a long and potentially confusing history with New Zealand’s gang scene. The swastika
was taken up by rebellious motorcycle gangs around the world and copied by local gangs,
including the patched streets gangs that were predominately Māori (Gilbert 2013, p. 42).
The use of the swastika by these groups did not equate to white supremacy; it was simply
used as a way of thumbing their nose at society. For the white power gangs, it was returned
to its more common meaning. The number 14 relates to the ‘fourteen words’ of US white
supremacist leader David Lane, which read, ‘We must secure the existence of our people
and a future for white children’ (Michael 2009). The number 88 is a substitute for HH (H
being the eighth letter of the alphabet), which is an abbreviation of Heil Hitler. 14 and 88
were often used together, and as with the swastika, these would be scrawled as graffiti, dis-
played as tattoos or stitched or drawn onto clothing. Unlike the swastika, these numbers
were more coded and thus could be used as covert signals to those in the know. In many
instances, these numbers are used to express white supremacy while hiding it in plain
sight, but in the case of the skinheads they were often worn alongside more overt signifiers
like the swastika.
While the Asian focal concern and certain symbols bonded these groups together, the
ideological underpinnings of this movement were notably primitive. Many skinheads were
open advocates of fascism and ethno-nationalism, and were proponents of antisemitic
conspiracy theories, but in practice these ideologies were often little more than set-dres-
sing designed to justify racism and violence, and were often put to the wayside whenever
they became inconvenient. Much like the patched street gangs, the factors that drew young
men toward membership in skinhead gangs were more related to status, excitement, and
brotherhood than ideology. Certain key figures attempted to solidify and develop these
political aspects, but were met with far more failure than success.
Colin King-Ansell, who despite being the leader National Socialist Party of New
Zealand in the late 60s and a founding member of the New Zealand Fascist Union, was
a fringe figure who in the 1990s saw the growth of skinhead gangs as a chance to rekindle
whatever ambitions he had. He attempted to influence one group in particular, Unit 88 in
Auckland, but that went the same way as his Nazi Party: nowhere.
In 1990, far-right ideologue Kerry Bolton formed a group called The Order of the Left
Hand Path, which attempted to marry rising interest in the far right with ideas of the
occult and satanism (Leeuwen 2008). He was also the director of the National Front in
the 1970s, in 1981 he co-founded the New Zealand branch of esoteric-fascist Church of
Odin in 1981 (Spoonley 1981, p. 105), and remains a prolific author on far-right topics.
Kyle Chapman was a teen skin and drug addict in Invercargill, before moving to
Christchurch, becoming clean from drugs, and moving into more political pursuits.
Chapman attempted to lead groups into great political realms, firstly under the banner
of the Hammerskins, and then later under the name the Right Wing Resistance, and
encouraged his members to be clean of drugs and alcohol and stay fit. His rationale
was that in battle his men needed a clear mind strong body – but his battle was more
often with his troops, who were far more interested in partying than politics. Ultimately
this tension was fatal to the group’s longevity.
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In all, the white power gangs that flared in the 1990s were characterised by young men
who occupied street corners, drank cheap cider and sneered at outsiders. While they were
pushed toward gang membership by economic factors, and were bound together by shared
racism, skinheads’ engagement with far-right ideology was often limited. Their philoso-
phical underpinnings were crude and often poorly understood, and their gangs were pri-
marily an outlet for disposed pākehā youth who wanted an identity and status.
The peak and the fall – the 1990s
In the early 1990s, there was a surge of white supremacist or reactionary groups around the
world and the advent of the internet meant that their literature was easily spread (Dennehy
and Newbold 2001, p. 188). In New Zealand, a 1997 book – largely a photo essay – on New
Zealand gangs by Bill Payne called Staunch featured a section on skinheads, and this gave
the movement a ‘minor shot in the arm’ (Addison 1996, p. 103). Also influential was the
1992 film Romper Stomper. It became a cult classic for many youths who identified with
the skinhead characters and sought to mimic their beliefs and lifestyle. The film had a
major impact in shaping the skinhead scene in New Zealand (Addison 1996, pp. 102–3;
Dennehy and Newbold 2001, p. 188.). Many predominantly Pākehā motorcycle gangs,
particularly those in the South Island such as the Epitaph Riders, the Devil’s Henchmen,
and the Road Knights, went through a dramatic visual change as their traditionally shaggy
appearance gave way to close-cropped or shaved heads. Indeed, many skinhead gangs had
close links with the mainly Pākehā outlaw motorcycle clubs, particularly the South Island
clubs and the Satan’s Slaves in the North Island. Perhaps the most significant group to
emerge from the white power ranks was Christchurch’s Harris Gang, at the core of
which was four brothers: Daryl, Ricky, Paul and Russell. They established a clubhouse
and a staunch group of followers and a reputation for violence and perverting the
course of justice through intimidation. In 1993, fulfilling their outlaw club ambitions,
the Harris Gang became the Christchurch chapter of the Road Knights.
By this time, the Road Knights in Invercargill and Timaru were being bolstered by a
young, staunchly white power-oriented skinhead gang called the Bandenkrieg (in
German: ‘gang war’). Also informally known as the ‘Germans’ or ‘Young Germans’, the
group acted as a feeder club to the Road Knights and was at least partially under the
outlaw club’s control. Another notable group was the Fourth Reich, which formed in
Christchurch’s Paparua Prison (now called Christchurch Men’s Prison) in the early
1990s, a small but hard-core gang who controlled the prison’s East Wing as well as
much of the jail in Invercargill. During the mid-1990s, it was said that any ‘skin’ who
was sent to East Wing would be stood over by the Fourth Reich and told "he must join
them, grow his hair back, or ‘go West’ [to the protection wing]" (Addison 1996,
p. 197). Although formidable within the prison, the Fourth Reich struggled to maintain
strong numbers on the outside, but nevertheless did develop a presence in Christchurch,
Nelson, Greymouth, Timaru and Dunedin (Dennehy and Newbold 2001, p. 189).
In 1991, two members of the Fourth Reich killed Hemi Huntley, a Greymouth Māori
man, in a racially motivated murder. Ironically, one of the killers, Neihana Foster, was
himself part-Māori. This seemingly anomalous situation highlighted the often special –
though seldom explicitly discussed – status given to Māori in skinhead gangs, as exhibited
by their occasional inclusion in such groups. It is unclear, however, why this status did not
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extend to the Māori victim. Such a paradox highlights the lack of ideological or philoso-
phical rigour evident within many skinhead groups. Prominent skinhead leader Kyle
Chapman, using the words of Robert Mathews – the leader of an American white nation-
alist group called ‘The Order’ – put it thus: ‘If it looks white, acts white, and fights white,
then it is white.’ For his part, Foster told police that his father was white and his heart was
white (Gilbert 2013, p. 144).
The killing was not the only time the Fourth Reich came to national attention. Alongside
other attacks andmurders, in 1997, amember of the gang –whodescribed himself as having
the rank of ‘private’ – had his finger cut off. The victim told the ChristchurchHigh Court he
was punished for wanting to leave the group (Gilbert 2013, p. 144), but it is widely known to
those close to the gang that the punishment was for theft of the gang’s drug supply.
In one response to growing concern around skinhead-related violence, and in recog-
nition of the damaging publicity to the city at the centre of skinhead activity, the Christch-
urch City Council helped fund the NewWay Trust in 1994. Established by Kyle Chapman,
the trust’s objectives were:
(a) To enable and assist young people alienated from Mainstream [sic] society (particu-
larly those known as Skinheads) to participate in rehabilitation programmes.
(b) To assist young people who are unemployed to increase their skills and obtain useful
employment (New Way Trust 1994, p. 1).
An evaluation of the trust’s work commissioned by the Christchurch City Council and
the police Crime Prevention Unit in 1995 gave a largely positive view of the work being
undertaken (See Addison 1996). Nevertheless, the trust quickly became controversial
when Chapman confessed to numerous historic race-based crimes he had carried out as
a skinhead in Invercargill, including the firebombing of a marae. At the time, Chapman
told the media the confession was to ‘ensure he paid his debt to society’ (Gilbert 2013,
p. 145), commenting later that it was part of an Narcotics Anonymous pledge he had
taken after giving up drugs and alcohol and becoming a Christian (Kyle Chapman, personal
communication, 2007). Despite the seriousness of the crimes, Chapman escaped a jail sen-
tence, largely due to his positive work at the New Way Trust. The trust’s chairperson and
Christchurch City Councillor, David Close, told reporters he admired Chapman’s
courage in confessing, something he took ‘as evidence of his commitment to a new way
of life’ (Gilbert 2013, p. 145).
However, in 1997, Chapman again created headlines when he was linked to the distri-
bution of racist literature which called on ‘Young patriots … for the formation of a fascist
youth group’. The pamphlets, which were distributed to many Christchurch mailboxes,
carried a picture of a paramilitary figure and implored: ‘If you love your race and
nation and have the courage to fight for your homeland … Join Now!’ Chapman’s
desire to help motivate disillusioned Pākehā youth had clearly taken a more radical
path. His association with the trust became untenable and he left to establish a new skin-
head gang – the Hammerskins – which became a chapter of an international skinhead
movement that, for a short time, became quite prominent in different parts of the
country. Under Chapman’s leadership the group shunned drugs, encouraged only moder-
ate use of liquor, and promoted general wellbeing because ‘your better fitness may be the
deciding factor in battle’ (New Zealand Hammerskins, c. 2003).
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The most obvious skinhead and white power activities occurred in the South Island
where there are smaller populations of Māori and Pacific peoples. One notable exception
to this trend was the rise of a group called Unit 88 in West Auckland,1 which formed
under the guidance of Colin King-Ansell. Unit 88 was overtly racist and established a
base in an industrial area in Henderson, soon receiving significant media attention
simply for their brash appearance in the heart of an area with a significant Māori and
Pacific population. A co-founder of Unit 88, Karl Warlock, said to the media that
attacks on black families had led the public to believe Christchurch was the main
centre for white power activities, but ‘[y]ou might be surprised how many skinheads
there are in the Auckland district’ (Gilbert 2013, p. 146). The gang began printing
and distributing white supremacist leaflets and the Race Relations Conciliator, Rajen
Prasad, said he would look to take legal action as such material ‘incites racial disharmony
and breaches our anti-discrimination laws’ (Gilbert 2013, p. 146). The gang also elicited
comment in Parliament with opposition MPs calling for race-hate laws. Minister of
Justice Doug Graham responded that he was satisfied existing legislation was adequate
and that the Race Relations Conciliator would act as necessary (New Zealand Parliamen-
tary Debates 1997). But a more immediate deterrent came from both the Black Power
and the Head Hunters who told the media that Unit 88 would not be tolerated and
would be subjected to ‘street justice’ (Gilbert 2013, p. 146). The threats were not
hollow, and following a visit from the Head Hunters, Unit 88 vacated their clubhouse
and quickly petered out (Gilbert 2013, p. 146).
The sudden rise and fall of Unit 88 is a microcosm of skinhead gang evolution gener-
ally. As with the Fourth Reich and the strength of white supremacy in South Island
prisons, the white supremacy movement flared significantly in the early and mid-1990s
began to fade by the end of the decade. Even in the stronghold city of Christchurch,
the street prominence of skinheads all but disappeared. The wider skinhead fashion had
ebbed, and with it, the skinhead gangs. Unlike the patched gangs, they were unable to
achieve significant longevity. Many of these groups lacked the organisational structure
of the patched gangs, and although some skinheads held on to their ideals, the improving
economy and lower unemployment – particularly among pākehā – robbed the scene of
recruits. Moreover, unlike the majority of the established gangs who were born in a
period in the 1960s and 1970s that prided itself on shunning private material possessions
and a culture of sharing and collectivism, the skinheads were of a time when individualism
and self-attainment were to the fore. Such an ethos was not as conducive to successfully
forming the bonds – or purchasing a physical base, such as a clubhouse – that had pre-
viously gelled the patched gangs together. Underscoring the idea that gang formation is
a consequence of social conditions and not ethnicity, while ethnic minorities may face
‘multiple marginality’ (Vigil 1988) and therefore be more susceptible to gang formation,
the establishment of gangs by a dominant ethnic group is achieved when the necessary
conditions present themselves.
The alt-right
But for all that, in the 2000s the visible face of white supremacy appeared to disappear to
all but very small pockets. That was until it sprang to life in the form of the terror attack of
15 March 2019.
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That was, at least, how it appeared. In reality, white supremacy in New Zealand hadn’t
disappeared as much as it had transformed. While connections between New Zealand
groups such as skinhead gangs of the 1990s and the accused Christchurch shooter have
been widely speculated about, no evidence of any such connections has emerged, and
thus far it does not appear likely that any will. Instead, his primary contact with white
supremacist communities appeared to have been online, through websites like 8chan.
Alongside the fact that he was Australian, and had only resided in the country for a
few years before the attacks, this was taken by many as being evidence that the attack
was not representative of any significant concentration of white supremacists in New
Zealand. In fact, however, the attack was the outcome of an international ‘alternative
right’ movement that had taken at least some root in New Zealand long before, but had
gone largely unnoticed up until that point.
The alt-right2 is a movement that began on the internet and grew to prominence
through its support of Donald Trump’s 2016 US presidential election campaign
(Hawley 2017, p. 115). Although they share many of the ideas and conspiracy theories
of older far-right groups, their demographics and mode of engagement are significantly
different. While still predominantly young, white, and male, they are much more likely
to be of middle-class origin3 and relatively well educated. This demographic change pro-
duces a movement that rejects the gang-like behaviour of the skinheads, and is instead
much more concerned with the quasi-intellectual aspects of the extreme right that often
fell to the wayside in past groups, such as fascist ideology, and conspiracy theories such
as Cultural Marxism (Lynn 2018) and white genocide (Perry 2003). This focus, in turn,
creates much grander ambitions: instead of fighting for control of the streets, the alt-
right see themselves as an intellectual vanguard, poised to take over a weak and decadent
west like the Nazis did to Germany in 1933. In this sense, the alt-right have much more in
common with the more intellectually-oriented figures in the 90s skinhead groups – such as
Kyle Chapman and Colin King-Ansell – than the groups that they tried and largely failed
to influence.
Compared with other political groups, the scale of the alt-right movement is difficult to
quantify because the bulk of their activity is undertaken through the internet. Many
among the alt-right are radicalised online, often without real-life contact with any radica-
lising influences, and participate anonymously in the movement through large far-right
communities in lawless online forums like 4chan and the now-defunct 8chan, the right-
wing focused twitter-alternative Gab, and the encrypted messaging system Telegram.
These online spaces provide many of the benefits for their members that could previously
only be found in offline groups: members can openly indulge in hate speech and conspi-
racy theories among a large group of peers without fear of being punished or ostracised,
and can enjoy support, brotherhood and friendship where they were otherwise cut off
from their real-life community. In this way, the psycho-social factors are similar to the
skinhead gangs, but the delivery is significantly different. As a result, the drive to create
and participate in real-life groups is much weaker than the 1990s gangs.
Similarly, and perhaps as a result of having emerged on the internet rather than the
street corner, the alt-right are much more concerned with the personal repercussions of
being identified as members of an extreme movement. Where shaved heads and swastika
tattoos were a permanent or semi-permanent costume that could not be removed when
members went to work, the alt-right often prefer to keep their extreme views hidden
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from outsiders by keeping them shrouded in plausible deniability. While the movement’s
discussions online froth with extreme racism and calls for racial violence, members also
share methods of subtly converting others to their ideas without exposing themselves to
the social stigma of being outed as a fascist. Alt-right groups regularly cover their ideals
in a veneer of either irony or humour, with the goal of communicating to those who
share their views while leaving little of any substance for their enemies to latch onto
(Greene 2019).
This online focus means that New Zealand’s geographical isolation is no longer a sig-
nificant barrier against the influence of radical overseas groups. Although some skinhead
gangs had international connections – notably Kyle Chapman’s Hammerskins – this pales
in comparison to the contemporary movement. While the alt-right preach ideas of nation-
alism and nativism, their decentralised online communities make them naturally interna-
tionalist, and the movement is best understood as something with little relationship to
nationality or physical geography. The movement has its origins and largest base of
support in the United States, and therefore takes much of its language and outlook
from the American system, but members tend to view themselves as fighting for the sur-
vival of a wider western or white civilisation that transcends national borders.
Changing motivators
As with the rise of New Zealand’s skinheads in the 80s and 90s, the ascent of the alt-right
has been bolstered by economic factors. The majority of the young people participating in
the alt-right reached the age of entering the workforce during or after the 2007–2008
global financial crisis, in a period that has seen increased concerns around issues such
as income inequality, the increased cost and necessity of university degrees and the
decline in their value, the rise of the precarious employment of the ‘gig economy,’ and
the decline of the middle class. Members of the millennial generation have borne the
brunt of much of this instability, and as a result are generally not experiencing the econ-
omic outcomes that they were raised to expect, either in the USA (Kurz et al. 2018) or New
Zealand (Munro 2018). In New Zealand, rising house prices have put home ownership – a
traditional marker of middle-class success – out of reach of many. Most significantly, this
economic pressure is impacting a different section of society than the recessions of the 80s
and 90s. Instead of pushing the working class into unemployment, the shrinking middle
class is instead pushing young people into the working class (OECD 2019). As a result,
those pushed toward the far right in a similar manner to New Zealand’s skinheads are
now those who were raised to be in the lower middle class, but whose economic
outlook is less rosy than they expected. While the economic hardship faced by this
group is demonstrably less than others, in relative terms it has proven substantial
enough to produce the kind of anger and alienation needed for the far right to grow.
Although it may not be accurate to say that economic upheaval necessarily precipitates
the outgrowth of far right movements – indeed many past economic downturns have
gone by without far right groups emerging – it is apparent that such upheaval is a signifi-
cant precondition for it, should other social features also be present.
Similarly to the focal concern of the gangs of the 1990s, the alt-right have a focus on
immigration, but in keeping with their more global community it is far more international
in focus. Economic concerns are intertwined in public discourse with issues of
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immigration in countries around theWestern world, and this has further fuelled the rise of
the far right. In the UK and Europe this was reflected in concerns around the European
migrant crisis and the alleged economic burden created by refugees, while in the USA
debate has focused on immigration through the border with Mexico and its distorting
effect on the labour market. In New Zealand, similar concerns have been based around
the effect of foreign land ownership and immigration on the housing market. Whether
well-founded or not, these fears around immigration have been significant and widely-
felt enough to give rise or contribute to a range of political responses, including America’s
proposed border wall, Britain’s exit from the EU, and, to a much lesser degree, New Zeal-
and’s 2017 ban on foreign land purchases. As with the rise of Asian migration in the 90s,
these issues have also given the far right a significant advantage by pushing their xenopho-
bic views closer to mainstream political discourse. Although the alt-right are ideologically
prejudiced against a wide range of groups, and are particularly antisemitic, they have
largely chosen to focus their anti-immigration efforts on islamophobia, primarily
because the narrative of an Islamic terrorist threat is a particularly easy sell in the west
in the post-9/11 age, and because the movement of large numbers of refugees into non-
English speaking countries in Europe has made disinformation about the alleged crimes
of refugees in those countries easier to spread without challenge.
Real-world groups
Determining the size of the alt-right movement in New Zealand is particularly difficult
because of its online focus. The primary websites that the alt-right use are notoriously
difficult to investigate: because users on 4chan and 8chan are anonymous and discussion
threads are active for no more than a few hours, even the size of the communities there are
not readily apparent. 4chan itself is very large, with 22 million average monthly users
according to its own data (4chan n.d.), but the alt-right on 4chan are largely confined
to a single subforum called /pol/, for which visitor numbers are not available. It is more
possible to discern the proportion of New Zealanders who participate in the community
on /pol/: users marked as being from New Zealand make up 0.66% of all posts on /pol/
since 2014 (4plebs 2019), and a study of /pol/ by Hine et al. (2017) found that although
the forum was dominated by posters from the USA, New Zealanders created more
posts per capita than any other nationality.
Instead, we are left to gauge the movement’s significance by the real-world action that it
undertakes. Overseas, a range of alt-right affiliated groups have appeared in the real world.
Much like New Zealand’s competing skinhead groups in the 1990s, however, the alt-right
as a whole is leaderless and prone to internal rifts and ideological disputes, and as a result
there is no official or broadly agreed-upon alt-right organisation. The movement briefly
coalesced behind Donald Trump during his election campaign, but lost interest and confi-
dence in him after his presidency began, and has struggled to agree on support for any
person, group, or course of action since. As a result, the groups that spring from the
alt-right vary considerably in style, from groups like the Proud Boys, a men-only organ-
isation that has been described as an ‘alt-right fight club’, (Southern Poverty Law Center
2017), to Atomwaffen Division, a Nazi-themed paramilitary terrorist group whose
members have been involved in five murders (Mathias 2018). Members of the alt-right
have reportedly also had some success infiltrating existing political groups, with the
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intention of pushing them toward alt-right ideas: members of an alt-right group called The
New Guard gained executive positions in the youth wing of the Australian National party
before being found out and expelled (Mann 2018), and in the USA a member of Identity
Evropa who had marched in the Unite the Right rally was elected as a precinct committee
officer for the Republican party in Washington state (Weill 2018).
As of 2019, only a small number of alt-right style real-world groups have emerged in
New Zealand. The most dramatic of them was the Dominion Movement, who came to
public attention in 2018 after putting up recruitment posters in bus stops in the Mana-
watū. The group’s website claimed that they were a ‘grass-roots identitarian activist
organisation committed to the revitalisation of our country and our people: White
New Zealanders’, and opposed consumerism, transgenderism, and immigration (Kilmis-
ter 2018). The website avoided overt references to racism or fascism, but used terminol-
ogy commonly employed by the alt-right to signal white nationalism while maintaining
plausible deniability. Pictures on the website showed young white men posing with their
faces covered, often holding New Zealand flags, and in one picture a black flag bearing a
white Sonnenrad, a symbol which was also worn by the accused Christchurch mosque
shooter (Enoka 2018). The group’s numbers were not advertised, although they
claimed to have groups in both Auckland and Wellington. The group abruptly
announced that it was shutting down immediately after the shootings, however, and
has not visibly resurfaced since.
A similar group called Action Zealandia surfaced a few months after the shooting, and
appears to be growing. The group’s website uses similar language to the Dominion Move-
ment, but has noticeably pulled back on the former’s use of overt far right imagery, pre-
sumably as a reflection of the greater scrutiny levelled at such groups after the March 15
attack. The website’s monthly ‘Action Reports’ show images of groups of young men with
blurred faces exercising, hiking, collecting rubbish, and posing with New Zealand flags and
historical monuments, and posts articles on subjects such as ‘Chinese influence in New
Zealand politics’, and ‘Nationalism and the environment’. The group claims to have chap-
ters in Auckland, Palmerston North, and Christchurch. Zealandia’s links to the online alt-
right communities are clear: on the second of August 2019, a user claiming to be a member
posted a thread on 4chan announcing the group’s formation and soliciting new members
in major New Zealand cities. While it is not apparent whether they share membership with
any other current or previous groups, the group is connected to older movements by Kerry
Bolton, whose name appears in comments on the site’s articles and is reported to be men-
toring the group, but we have no evidence to confirm that. The group’s membership
appears to be growing, with reports on their website claiming that they have added new
chapters, and showing pictures of what appear to be new members in different locations
around the country.
As they have overseas, alt-right groups have also targeted New Zealand universities for
recruitment. In 2017 posters bearing the slogans ‘White lives matter!’ and ‘Let’s take our
country back’, were put up around Auckland university by a group called the Western
Guard, who had a recruitment website that claimed links to an overseas alt-right group
called Vanguard America (Collins 2017). In 2019 a sticker campaign by Action Zealandia
targeted universities (among other sites), with stickers reportedly discovered in the Uni-
versity of Auckland and the University of Canterbury. New Zealand Universities have
also played host to at least two student groups that were accused of having far right
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leanings: at Auckland University a group called The European Students Association had a
stall at the university’s Clubs Expo, but shut down in response to a public backlash, and at
AUT a New Zealand European Association was established but not formally incorporated
by the university (Collins 2017). Both groups still have pages on Facebook, but neither
appear to be active. Fears of these groups may be overplayed, however: the Facebook
pages associated with them attracted only a handful of followers, and any evidence of
far-right allegiance was so heavily couched in plausible deniability as to be functionally
non-existent. Nevertheless, students at Auckland University have continued to raise con-
cerns of far-right activity at the university (Auckland University Students’ Association
2019), but no further organised groups on campus have become apparent.
Despite having a greater interest in politics than the skinheads, the alt-right have thus
far shown limited signs of engaging with any political parties in New Zealand. This
appears to be because there is no obvious home for them among the existing parties:
New Zealand’s right wing parties are primarily neoliberal (which conflicts with the alt-
right’s ideas of National Socialism) and the primary source of anti-immigrant rhetoric
in the most recent election was the Labour party, with which they disagree on most
other points. There was some interest in the New Zealand First party, whose ideals gen-
erally hew against neoliberalism and immigration: during the 2017 election posters on
4chan created Winston Peters memes, and Peters publicly signed a printed meme depict-
ing Pepe the frog holding a SuperGold card, but after the party went into coalition with
Labour many appeared to lose interest.
Symbols and fashion
The alt-right display their affiliation using many of the same symbols and identifiers as
their skinhead predecessors, but use these symbols in ways that reflect their substantially
different background and goals, and groups in New Zealand have followed the overseas
pattern of cloaking their ideas and actions in a shroud of plausible deniability.
While the alt-right use symbols of the Third Reich such as swastikas, SS runes, and the
numbers 14 and 88, which were also used by past groups, they also make use of symbols
that were generally not previously used by groups in New Zealand, but which have become
popular among far-right groups overseas in recent years, such as the sonnenrad, or ‘black
sun’ symbol, which serves as a less obvious stand-in for the swastika among many groups
in the US or Europe. The alt-right have also developed a range of unique symbols that are
derived from their origins in online communities such as Pepe the frog, a cartoon frog that
became a meme on 4chan and was then appropriated by the far right, and the ‘OK’ hand
gesture that the accused Christchurch shooter famously flashed to press photographers
during an early court appearance.
While the majority of the signs used by the alt-right would be recognisable to a skin-
head from the 1990s, the alt-right use their symbols in significantly different ways. Reflect-
ing their middle-class backgrounds, members of the alt-right are much more concerned
with social stigma than earlier groups were, and therefore tend to avoid giving visible
signs of their affiliation. As a result, their offline appearance is radically different:
instead of signalling their alienation and rebellion with shaved heads and tattoos, they
adhere to no proscribed standards of dress, and their use of overt symbols is generally
kept to online safe spaces such as 4chan.
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Members of the alt-right in the USA have previously flirted with more overt displays of
ideological adherence: during self-styled alt-right leader Richard Spencer’s brief moment
of cultural relevance many adopted his vaguely Hitlerian short-back-and-sides haircut as a
subtle (but deniable) signifier, while others bought clothing with memes and in-jokes such
as Pepe the frog printed on them. As their confidence grew, some began demonstrating in
public and regularly clashing with antifascist counter protesters. This culminated in the
Unite the Right rally in Charlottesville, Virginia in 2017, a far-right rally where
members of the alt-right were seen carrying flags and shields bearing symbols including
swastikas, sonnenrads, and confederate flags.
Charlottesville showed initial signs of being a success for the alt-right, as images of a
column of young protesters marching at night with flaming torches were shared around
the world by a shocked media. Ultimately, however, the rally proved to be a harsh
lesson in the consequences of acting in public. When a white supremacist killed a
counter-protester with his car on the second day of the event, protesters and their
groups found themselves the subject of intense scrutiny from the media and the law,
and quickly realised that they had lost the ability to claim that they were the victims of
anti-white persecution. As public shock turned to anger, protesters who had been
filmed bare faced were quickly identified and ‘doxed,’ (Atkinson 2018) with many
facing social stigma and losing their jobs (see for example McKay 2017; Pasha-Robinson
2017). Realising that they had neither the stomach nor the numbers to endure a battle for
public acceptance in the streets, the alt-right abruptly and near-universally withdrew from
efforts to present themselves in public as fascists.
Following these issues, many alt-right groups have focused on finding ways to exist in
public without attracting meaningfully dangerous negative attention. The most obvious
tactic – and one that many groups and individuals were already used to using – is to
create plausible deniability by suppressing their more obviously extreme aspects and
cloaking their ideology in generalities. Alt-right groups in New Zealand have followed
this blueprint: the short-lived Auckland University European Students Association, for
example, chose Celtic patterns and iconography that were often used by white supremacist
groups, but not exclusive to them, and a slogan that was similar to – but distinct from –
one used by the SS (Loren 2017). Similarly, Action Zealandia’s website is careful to create
plausible deniability by avoiding overt references to fascism and racism, couching its ideo-
logical statements instead in broad or misleading terms like ‘our degradation’, and ‘demo-
graphic integrity’. Whether these attempts at obfuscating their intentions will be effective
for these groups is not yet possible to say, however.
Conclusion
White supremacist ideology in New Zealand flared briefly in the 1990s in the form of the
skinheads, who were momentarily prominent within the gang scene but declined rapidly
as fashions changed and the groups failed to achieve longevity. While these groups were
involved in gang wars and multiple race-related murders, they were ideologically incon-
sistent and generally more interested in fighting and partying than any serious political
goals.
The newly-arising alt-right are a considerable deviation from past far right groups, but
are similar in many ways as well. They are much more focused on ideology and quasi-
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intellectualism, and are part of a larger online community that sees itself as transcending
national borders. The extreme edge of this movement made itself known most visibly
through the March 15 terror attack, but organised groups that aim to be more socially
acceptable have begun to appear around the country as well.
While very few members have carried across the two movements save for a few ideo-
logues, both inherited a similar bank of symbols and identifiers from the wider history of
the far right movement, such as the swastika and the numbers 14 and 88, to which the alt-
right have added a few unique symbols based on memes and in-jokes. Where the move-
ments differ is how these symbols are used: where the skinheads shaved their heads and
tattooed their bodies to express anger and alienation from society, the alt-right cloak
their allegiance in plausible deniability in order to avoid social stigma.
Economic upheaval appears to have been a key feature in the rise of both the skinheads
and the alt-right, but varying types of upheaval produced markedly different groups.
Where the skinhead gangs of the 1990s were populated by young men who had been
pushed into unemployment by an economic recession, the alt-right draw their member-
ship from those pushed out of the shrinking middle class, and as a result their priorities,
goals, and methods of action are strongly reflective of their middle class origins.
The alt-right are the newest heirs to a long history of far-right white supremacist ideol-
ogy and action, both in New Zealand and overseas. While we cannot say for certain what
the future holds for this movement, it is clear that it represents both a continuance from
the past as well a considerable change.
Notes
1. The name is derived from the letter ‘H’ being the eighth letter of the alphabet, and so 88 is
HH which in turn is a contraction of ‘Heil Hitler’.
2. The alt-right movement has largely abandoned the name ‘alt-right’ in favour of less specific
and more plausibly deniable terms such as ‘nationalist’ and ‘identitarian’. We have elected to
use the term here because it is a name that was originally chosen and used by the movement,
and because it refers exclusively to the recent internet-based movement.
3. Because of their online anonymity, no census of the alt-right and their economic back-
grounds exists. It is clear to us that from our observation of this movement online
however that their modes of expression reflect middle-class attitudes and concerns, and
their goals explicitly target a return to the middle class ideals of the American 1950s.
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